Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Book II, chapters 1-9, Book III, chapters 1-5

Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics introduces us to happiness as the ultimate human good—it is the highest of all goods and requires virtue (both intellectual and character virtue) to achieve it. 

Book II, then, is of utter importance to the whole of the Ethics because we are going to learn how we acquire virtue (focusing on character virtue until Bk VI), the prerequisite for happiness.  Since virtue controls happiness, we must know what the relevant virtues are by which to secure happiness and how to achieve them.  This is the heart of Book II.

More specifically, there are nine chapters within the second book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  (1) They begin by (re-)distinguishing the two types of virtue (intellectual and character virtue) and then focus upon the latter, character virtue.  Aristotle then proceeds to delineate how a character virtue is acquired (through habituation), (2) elaborates upon habituation, (3) notes the importance of pleasure and pain therein, (4) differentiates action and character, (5-6) identifies its genus and differentia (species), (7) notes the particular character virtues, (8) carefully differentiates the mean and extremes, and (9) encourages us as to how we achieve the mean.

Book II

Chapter 1:

What is virtue?  Well, first we distinguish the two types of virtue:

Intellectual Virtue:  Learned through education, takes time and experience.

Character Virtue: Learned through habituation [character virtue: ēthos; habit: ethos]. 

We will focus on character virtue until Book VI. 

So, what is character virtue?

Character Virtue is neither a matter of nature (instinct) nor is it contrary to nature.  A person cannot train a stone, whose nature is to fall downward, to fall upwards, no matter the repetition of training.  “Therefore the virtues come to be present neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but in us who are of such a nature as to take them on, and to be brought to completion in them by means of habit” (Aristotle, NE, trans. Sachs, 1103a25)—i.e., virtue comes to belong to us by nature only in the sense that it is our nature to practice virtue, not in the sense of it being natural or non-natural that we are virtuous (e.g., inherently good or evil). 

How do we acquire character virtue?

We have within us a potentiality for being virtuous people; we actualize this potentiality by action. Our potentiality for being virtuous is the exercise of our capacity for doing virtuous things.

We acquire virtues by repeatedly doing right actions—eventually we learn that these right actions must express right attitudes and that we exercise them until that time in which we have acquired a permanent disposition, that is, the habit for virtue (habit: hexis in the Greek and habitus in the Latin), such that we come to enjoy acting rightly—it gives us pleasure. 

Aristotle likens our acquisition of virtue to that of a craft (although refines this analogy later)—we have the potentiality to sew, we actualize our potentiality by actually sewing, we become seamstresses by developing our capacities, just repeating the production until we become skilled at it.  In analogy, thus, we become just by doing just things; we become temperate by doing temperate things; we become brave by doing brave things.  Virtue, then, is a matter of the habituation of right actions until they become permanent habits. 

We can also think, for example, of muscle memory: whether it is playing baseball or piano, you have to train your body to do what will eventually become natural; with practice, you can become great at this and enjoy it (get pleasure from it) for both itself and your success at it … likewise with virtue!

But … Just as we habituate virtue, habituation can ruin virtue (1103b6).  Again, recall muscle memory, you can learn bad posture as well as good.  Playing the harp incorrectly habituates incorrect harp playing, that horrible playing becomes the habit, thus ruining the virtue of good harp playing.  If this weren’t the case, we would have no need for teachers—people would be born good or bad or we would only need people with self-discipline to self-habituate.  But, since we must learn what is good and can habituate badness, we need teachers to school us in the good that is to be then habituated.

It is the same with virtues.  We can habituate fear as easily as bravery (matters of character virtue), gluttonous behavior as easily as temperance (matters of desire and appetite), etc.:

“To sum it up in a single account: a state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities.  That is why we must perform the right activities, since differences in these imply corresponding differences in the states.  It is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from our youth.  On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-important” (trans. Irwin, 1103b20-25).

Chapter 2:

elaborates upon habituation with Aristotle noting that the purpose at hand is not to know goodness, but to become good.  (Between explicit and implicit, is the idea that if we were not good, we would not care to know the good.)  Thus, we will proceed to examine the right ways of acting.  Do not let the distinction between knowing and being fool you, though, because he quickly affirms that “… actions should accord with the correct reason” (1103b30)—he notes that this is a common belief we will assume to get us started (and discuss it fully, later) and that the proceeding must sketch answers, not be held concretely as definitive. 

The most important key throughout here is to recognize that virtuous states tend to be ruined by excess and deficiency.  Aristotle cites strength, health, eating, and drinking as examples (1104a12)—i.e., to be strong, one must exercise, but too much exercise and one becomes like a certain now ex-Californian governor, hardly a model of human strength; one must eat to be healthy, but eating too much and one becomes health’s opposite; or, as they say, a little red wine and coffee are good for you, too much: you become a wino or caffeine addict, and thus, hardly healthy, etc. 

The same is true of all the character virtues, for example, bravery, temperance, etc.  To be brave, one must have a little fearfulness and a little recklessness—a touch of each extreme in some degree of balance—as we will see, not a perfect mean, but an approximate one. 

Once we have acquired character virtues, their continued exercise perpetuate the virtues (doing the virtue is to be virtuous)—e.g., abstaining from hedonistic pleasure habituates temperance, once we are temperate, our temperance permits us to abstain from hedonistic pleasure.  {an almost cyclical reinforcement, do X to get Y, having gotten Y, you can do X.}

Chapter 3:      The Importance of Pleasure and Pain

Teaches us that “… virtue of character is about pleasures and pains” (trans. Irwin, 1104b5).

Pleasure and pain impinge in various ways upon virtue. 

-- they are encouragements and dissuade-ments, these can be for or against virtue.

-- the correct acquisition of virtue results in pleasure.

The consequent feeling of pleasure or pain, then, signals one’s state of virtue—if after the action, one feels/shows pleasure, then the action was enjoyed, then the enactment of the action was done virtuously; if one is in pain (regret, unhappiness, etc.) after the action, it was not done from within the state of having/being that character virtue.  For example: if one abstains from having a smoke/drink/etc., then feels good that one withstood the temptation to have one, then one is temperate; if the abstinence brings unpleasant feelings, one is still in the process of habituation (well or not) the virtue of temperance. 

Chapter 4:     Virtuous Actions versus Virtuous Character

Differentiates Virtuous Actions versus Virtuous Character, which is essentially his clarification of the analogy that the acquisition of virtue is like that of a craft. 

Virtue differs from crafts in that a craft is determined to be such by the properties of its result (does the ship have water bearing properties, does it float, etc.); a virtue is determined not only by the properties of its result (was the excessive temptation resisted, etc.), but also by the state of the doer of the deed.  The agent must (1) know she is doing the virtuous action, (2) she must decide upon the virtue, and for its own good, and (3) she must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.  [For a craft, you need only the knowing, e.g., shipbuilding—for a virtue, the knowing is nothing really, without the deciding and acting upon it; we achieve these latter two states by frequent doing of the action, the practice that produces habituation.]

“Hence actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just and temperate person would do.  But the just and temperate person is not the one who [merely] does these actions, but the one who also does them in the way in which just or temperate people do them” (trans. Irwin, 1105b5).  –for example, resisting a vice because you lock yourself in a cage doesn’t mean you are temperate.

Chapters 5, 6, & 7 identify the genus and species broadly then concretely of virtue.

Chapter 5:    Virtue of Character: Its Genus

To ask about the genus of virtue is to ask, in general, what is virtue, in and of itself?  It could be any one of the three conditions in the soul: feelings, capacities, and states—one of these must be virtue.  Ultimately, he decides the genus of virtue is our state of being.

Chapter 6:    Virtue of Character: Its Differentia

So, virtue is a state, but what sort of state?

“… every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well” (trans. Irwin, 1106a15).   Virtue makes the state and performance of one’s function excellent. 

The virtue of the eyes is to see; the excellent functioning of the eyes is to see well; thus, to see well is the fulfillment of the function of the eyes and their virtue—will hold in all cases.

The virtue of the human being will be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well. 

This will be clear if we consider What is the sort of nature had by virtue?:

In something continuous and divisible, we can take more or less or equal parts; the equal division is some intermediate between extremes, that is, between excess and deficiency.

Numerically, 6 is always the mean between 2 and 10.  But… for ethics, the mean is relative. Aristotle’s example: if a trainer decides that ten pounds of food is too much and two is too few, he, still, will not prescribe every client to take six pounds of food, for six pounds may also be too much or too little depending upon that client. 

Likewise, for virtue, we must choose the intermediate between excess and deficiency relative to us that promotes virtue.  Thus, we must have the right “… feelings [or actions] at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, [this] is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue” (trans. Irwin, 1106b20). 

“Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what is intermediate” (trans. Irwin, 1106b25).

This is certainly tough—he notes, as for the Pythagoreans, that there are many ways to be incorrect and one way in which to be correct, thus it is far easier to be bad, than good—although not impossible!

The relativity of virtue as a mean then becomes clarified:

“Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.  It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency” (trans. Irwin, 1107a1).

–Thus, despite the relativity, we can legitimately, validly judge virtue from vice.

Chapter 7:     The Particular Virtues of Character

Okay, so!  Now Aristotle reminds us that we cannot just state the general account, but now must apply it to particular cases.  (Note the pedagogic rigor of his argumentation!)—But … this is also just a schema that will be filled out at length starting half way through Bk III …

Mean:Between:      Excess:Deficiency:

BraveryFear &               Nameless Rash  Confidence/Rash

                                    Cowardice

TemperancePleasure Intemperance (self-indulgence) Nameless/Insensible

                                    & PainIntemperanceIntemperance

GenerosityGiving Money &WastefulnessUngenerosity

(little honors)Taking MoneyViciousUngenerosity

MagnanimityHonor &Vanity/Honor-loverPusillanimity (timidity)

(great honors)DishonorIndifference

MildnessAngerIrascible (cantankerous)  Inirascible (passive)

TruthfulnessBoastfulnessSelf-deprecation

WitBuffoonery Boorishness

Friendlinessw/o ulterior motive: ingratiating       quarrelsome

                                                              w/ ulterior motive: flattery            ill-temper-ness

Shame(modesty)(ashamed of everything) (shameless)

* not a virtue, but makes one prone to it

Proper IndignationEnvy & Spite(spitefulness)(envy)

Justice------

He closes Book II with two more chapters: 

Chapter 8:   Relations between Mean and Extreme States

The excess and deficiency are contraries just as they are each contrary to the means.  People will attempt to persuade the intermediate by calling it (as its contrary) its extreme (e.g., the coward will call the brave rash—both bravery and rashness are contraries to cowardice, but the coward ignores the internal opposition between the mean and excess).

Chapter 9:    How can we Reach the Mean?

It is hard work to reach excellence. 

To reach the mean, one must avoid the extremes; the second best option is to tend towards the lesser of the two evils.  We must also self-reflect and determine what it is that we naturally drift towards and we need to know our own tendencies in order to correct our course.  And, we must always be aware (that is, beware) of pleasure and its sources.  We are naturally biased to pleasure, and this bias keeps us from unbiased judging if it really is good or not.  Following this advice, we will always keep towards the intermediate; but, this is hard to follow and some deviation from the perfect mean is normal and allowable. 

Book III (Chapters 1-5):      Pre-Conditions of Virtue

Book III explores the preconditions of virtue by exploring: (1) Voluntary and Involuntary Actions, (2) Decision, (3) Deliberation, (4) Wish, and how (5) Virtue and Vice are in Our Power, before moving on (6-12) to a close study of the individual character virtues. 

Chapter 1) Voluntary and Involuntary Actions

Virtue is about feelings and actions; they receive praise or blame if they are voluntary; they receive pardon and sometimes pity if they are involuntary.  Thus, to fully examine virtue, we must examine the voluntary and involuntary.

Involuntary:  Things come about by force or ignorance—things forced have their own external principle(s) in which the agent/victim contributes nothing.

Voluntary:  Things that come about by the principle of the agent’s own action

But, what about fear? 

If a tyrant orders you to do something shameful and will kill your family if you disobey, is your obedience voluntary or involuntary?

If you throw cargo overboard during a storm, it is sensible to do so to save lives, but insensible action if lives are not as risk; is your action a voluntary, welcome choice or involuntary, unwelcome choice?

Thus, in addition to their being Voluntary and Involuntary actions, there are also those actions that are Mixed.

Actions may be voluntary, he explains, in that the person (insofar as the principle of action is in the person) does them, but they are also involuntary in that the person would not choose to do so the action in its own right (1110a15).

Chapter 2)    Decision

Decision—that which is most proper to virtue and distinguishes characters from one another better than actions:

It is apparently voluntary, but less voluntary than the widest definition of voluntary

(it is voluntary, but not everything that is voluntary is decided; i.e., animals and children as well as spur-of-the-moment actions share in voluntary action, but not decision). 

It is not appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief. 

It involves reason and thought (thus, it is not shared with the nonrational).

It is (as the etymology of its name shows) what is chosen before other things:

prohaireton, what is decided, is haireon, chosen, pro, before other things. 

Chapter 3)    Deliberation

We deliberate about what is up to us—what we can do.  For those things we do not deliberate on, we don’t do such because “… none of these results could be achieved through our agency” (1112a30).

We deliberate not about all human affairs, but about those with impact on us and on which we have impact.  (e.g., Americans may talk about how the French should govern themselves, but we do not deliberate on it, because it is not that which we have agency in or are directly impacted by.)

We do not deliberate about exact and self-sufficient sciences (e.g. about letters, because we do not doubt about how to write them when we are spelling a word, etc.). 

We do deliberate about what comes about from our agency and in different ways on different occasions. 

We deliberate when we are uncertain about outcomes and when such are undefined.  We don’t deliberate about ends, but about what promotes ends (e.g., a doctor does not deliberate about whether he cures, but about which cure, an orator does not deliberate about whether he will persuade, but, rather, how he will do so, etc.).  “Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it” (trans. Irwin, 1112b15).  If several ways may reach the end, we deliberate about which will do so best, etc. 

“… all deliberation is inquiry, but not all inquiry—in mathematics, for instance—is deliberation” (trans. Irwin, 1112b20).

If a human being is a principle of action, as determined already, then deliberation is about the actions of which he is capable.  They are for the sake of other things, not themselves in and of themselves—i.e., means, not ends. 

Decision, then, is deliberative desire (we deliberate, that which we settle on is that which we desire, our decision, then is that of which we have deliberated and desire). 

Chapter 4) Wish(Counter Plato)

Wish is for the end.  Some think it is for the good; others think it is for the apparent good.

Those who think the good is wished:  it follows that what someone wishes, if he chooses incorrectly, is not wished for at all—e.g., if wished=good, yet wished turns out to be bad, the wished for is good and bad at once, thus contradiction. 

Those who think the apparent good is wished:  it follows that nothing is wished by nature; each person wishes what seems good to him, different things can be wished for, even contradictory things, by different people without logical contradiction. 

If we don’t like his logic, he says we can put it this way: in general, we wish the good, but each person wishes the apparent good.  Thus, the excellent person successfully wishes the good by actually wishing what is good, whereas the base person mistakes the good and thus only wishes for their apparent, but ultimately incorrect, good. 

Chapter 5)   Virtue and Vice are in Our Power

“We have found, then, that we wish for the end, and deliberate and decide about things that promote it; hence the actions concerned with things that promote the end are in accord with decision and are voluntary.  The activities of the virtues are concerned with these things [that promote the end]” (trans. Irwin, 1113b5).

This determines, then, that virtue is up to us, as is vice.  If we can choose virtue, it logically follows that we could also choose vice.  Being good or bad, decent or base, is up to us.  This is true for citizens as well as legislating bodies.  This holds for vices of the soul and of the body. 

This designation of responsibility justifies and enforces why we seek to encourage virtue and to correct vice. 

After Chapter 5, Aristotle moves on to discussions of each of the character virtues.