Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Born in Königsberg (capital of the province of East Prussia, it later became part of Germany and is today in Russia; he is considered a German philosopher).  He never really left, traveling no more than forty or so miles from his birthplace (he turned down teaching positions so not to have to leave).  He was born into a poor family and he lost both his parents while he was still relatively young. 

His educational upbringing was by the Pietists, a Protestant (Lutheran) sect that changed the focus from church ritual to personal piety emphasizing strict devotion; it ultimately turned Kant away from any practice of religion (his moral and religious writings were banned for a number of years during his life). 

Although, like the religion, his life is also characterized as strict, secluded, and predictable; neighbors were said to set their watches by his daily walk.  He never married and reputedly never engaged in any other comforts of women.  And, despite his treatise on art remaining the pallbearer of theory today, his actual exposure to artworks is severely limited.  

At ten, he studied theology at the Collegium Fredericianum, and excelled at classics.  At 16, he entered the University of Könisberg to study mathematics and physics; he was introduced to rationalist philosophy and Newtonian physics, influencing his critique of traditional idealism and creation of a “transcendental idealism.”  He became an expert in the physical sciences and mathematics and made impressive contributions to nearly every field of philosophy (from metaphysics to ethics to aesthetics to education to law to history… etc.).  He was employed as a private tutor for nine years then lectures for 15 years as a Privatdozent (a non-salaried instructor).

At 45 years old (1770), he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Königsberg.  He produced a number of early works on diverse topics, a number of them scientific, but none are regarded with much attention today. 

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten

Also know as: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals or

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

His Groundwork is the necessary foundation to be established before his major Critique of Practical Reason (1788), which set out to prove the truth and validity of his foundational principles established in the former, and before his more anthropological and normative works of ethics, which establish practical rules and examples of morality.

The Groundwork, then, has the task to establish the A priori basis for morality--that is, the metaphysical principles that make morality truly objective and universally valid. 

His foundation, this moral a priori grounded in reason, will be called his Categorical Imperative.  There are, according to Kant, three elaborations of this one principle (according to many readers and scholars, there seem to be four, sometimes five different elaborations in this text). 

Kant’s ethics are called Deontological and Meta-Ethics.  The former means based in duty; the latter means a study of ethics based upon pure a priori principles from reason alone.  In essence, his ethical system says that morality is formed from a rational foundation called the “Categorical Imperative,” which is a rational, universal, duty-based demand deducible by the mind alone; morality is obedience to this imperative while immorality violates it and is, thus, irrational.  It is duty-based in that moral content is not chosen by potential consequences (i.e., we are not nice to our siblings in order to get a cookie and avoid being sent to our room; instead, we are nice because it is universally, rationally, morally right, thus, it is our moral duty).

The book is laid out in a preface (which explains the necessity of the book’s project to be one of metaphysics, thus, neither an entirely pure study like logic, but more pure than a study of examples in the world or even an anthropology, which is one step more abstract, being based in reason) and three sections (which commence in common reason  and move towards the establishment and elaboration of unconditional law and then moves to prove the relevance and value of the moral law). 

Preface:

Ancient Greek Philosophy’s Three Divisions: Physics, Ethics, and Logic.

Rational Knowledge’s two divisions:

Material: concerned with some object and the laws to which these objects are subject; have empirical parts—Physics (laws of nature; empirical part: laws of nature as object of experience; concerned with why everything happens) or Ethics (laws of freedom; empirical part: laws of freedom as determinate of human will affected by nature; concerned with everything that ought to happen);

Formal: concerned with the form of understanding (thus, reason itself, universal rules of thought itself without regard to differences of its objects); no empirical part—Logic. 

Empirical: the philosophy founded on experience;

Rational: the philosophy founded on reason—but Kant refers to this as “pure” philosophy “… which sets forth its doctrines as founded entirely upon a priori principles …” (388)…

A priori = independent of experience (2+3=5; a bachelor is an unmarried man).  “Before experience.”  Pure knowledge—Reason is faculty that supplies these principles. 

A posteriori = dependent on experience (there are three apples; some bachelors are lonely).  “After experience.”  Empirical knowledge. 

When this Pure Philosophy is merely formal, we have Logic; when this is limited to determinate objects of the understanding, it is Metaphysics.

There is, thus, a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals—these will have both empirical and rational parts.

For Ethics as a metaphysics of morals, the empirical part is called practical anthropology and the rational part is simply called morals (we may clarify it in everyday usage as the distinction between practical and theoretical ethics).

Kant proposes the value of studying the rational part of the metaphysics of nature or of morals prior to their respective empirical parts (388)

—for example, the astronomer would do better to study the idea of the movements of the heavens before looking at all the bright dots of stars and planets through a telescope, the biologist would do better to study the taxonomical divisions between kingdoms and phylums before going into the field and looking at individual species … in like kind, all humans ought to study first the theories of ethics and/or the overarching principles before considering specific case studies.

Thus, he tells us, his current work, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, is primarily concerned with moral philosophy—thus, a pure philosophy limited to determinate objects of the understanding, more specifically: the rational part of a metaphysics of morals.

—He justifies this necessity by stating that all must admit that if a moral law is going to be valid, that is, as a ground of obligation, it needs to carry absolute necessity; such necessity cannot be found in the nature of a (particular) person or circumstances in the world (i.e., these are too changeable), thus we must look beyond the empirical (which gives us only practical rules) and find the a priori in the concepts of pure reason (which gives us moral law).  

So, we all have access to this ground for morality, this absolute, foundational principle, but we must become clear on what it is, for without it, morals are open to all sorts of corruption.  And, “For in the case of what is to be morally good, that it conforms to the moral law is not enough; it must also be done for the sake of the moral law” (390).

—Note the similarities to Aristotle here … what matters is NOT the result, but the voluntary choice and deliberation upon the moral law (Aristotle’s mean) and its guide to action that is done from this firm, stable foundation of the hexis, the state of one’s character … for both, even if one accidently does a really morally good act, one is not to be commended for it, for there was no intention that was noble directing the action … one must act for the sake of the moral law (the mean) … The difference, however, between Aristotle and Kant is whether this “for the sake of which” ends at the moral law (as for Kant, because it is indicative of the good will) or if it ends at happiness (as for Aristotle).

Being his “grounding,” he will here be seeking the a priori principle (“… nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality” (392)) that provides the foundation for the rational metaphysics of morals (his 1788 work, Critique of Practical Reason) (eventually, to lay the foundation for the practical, his 1797 normative work, Metaphysics of Morals). 

More specifically, his methodology in this work will see this a priori through Common Reason to move to  Unconditional Law (the a priori, that is, his “Categorical Imperative”) then work backwards  to prove the relevance/value of the Moral Law.

First Section: 

Transition from the Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality

to the Philosophical

I) Good Will:

(393-4):

1--There is nothing unqualifiedly good except a good will.

2--Constitution of a good will is one’s character—character will not be good without a good will.

3--Good will makes one worthy of being happy.

4--Some qualities help a will be good, but they presuppose a good will, they do not make the will’s goodness dependent upon them.

5--Good will is good only through its willing (i.e., is good in itself); not because of results or fitness/ability to achieve results.

(394-5):

But, this all sounds suspicious… so, we must explore Reason’s end as Good Will more in-depth contra Happiness:

1--If happiness were the real and ultimate end for humanity, nature would have designed us very poorly for it (why have reason?  This seems only to need instinct; in fact, the very sharp use of reason for achieving happiness seems to get us the inverse proportion of actual contentment—e.g., imagine if one knows all the pleasures one could achieve, each had becomes so much less satisfying, and one’s whole being is just propelled as a lacking, seeking mess that never actually has happiness).

(396):

2--Reason is a practical faculty—it is to have influence on (not wholly guide) the will;

3--Reason’s function is to produce a good will—this good will must not be a means to another end, but to be good in itself.

4--This good will must be “the highest good and condition of all the rest [all other goods], even of the desire for happiness” (396).

A—Note the difference here from Aristotle, who posited the greatest good as happiness and the perfection of the human function (having reason) to be acting in accord with virtue so as to achieve happiness.  For Kant, the greatest good is having a good will (thus, the basic motivating force that makes one’s character what it is); this is the end in itself, the greatest good is to be (able to be) good; the perfection of the human function (having reason) is to make the will good as an end in itself.

B—Happiness: the second purpose, after good will; a good, but not the greatest good; always conditional; can fulfill human function of having good will without being happy.

II) Duty: illustrative of good will (397- )

(1) Four cases, each reviews:

(A) actions contrary to duty—e.g., lying, cheating, stealing, etc.

(B) actions accord with duty, without immediate inclination, with mediated inclination—e.g., merchant charges all the same prices (even those s/he could easily swindle), in this case, he likely did not have immediate inclination (e.g., he loved all his customers), but just the mediated inclination to honesty that we cannot determine if this is done for duty to maxim or for some selfish reason or (better examples from translator): one pays one’s taxes not because one likes to, but out of desire to avoid consequences of not doing so; one is nice to people not because one likes them, but one wants to tally favor for a benefit in a future election result.

(C) actions accord with duty, with immediate inclination—e.g., to preserve one’s life is a duty that we have and we have an immediate inclination to do so.  But, in determining moral worth, this is not the best or clearest case because one’s inclination is along with duty, not clearly because of one’s duty (translator’s examples: one doesn’t commit suicide because all is well in one’s life or one doesn’t commit adultery because one’s spouse is the most desirable creature in the world—thus, these actions are done because of the inclination more clearly than because of one’s duty).

(D) actions accord with duty, contrary to immediate inclination—if, however, one’s life was full of woe, one desired greatly to make the pain cease, and yet one did not give in to inclination and yet acted in accord with duty, then we can say this is the clearest case wherein moral worth is to be granted that individual.

2. (2)Why is Case D best test of moral goodness?
   

“… this worth is moral and incomparably the highest of all, viz., that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty” (399).  Note that Kant is not saying we must be ascetics or puritans, but that in these last types of cases, we have the clearest illustration of a good will—everything that provides shades of grey for the evaluation of action of others is erased and we can judge the other clearly. 

(3) Three Principles of Duty:

(A) Action must be done from duty—illustrated by the above four cases

(B) Moral worth not in purpose or the result, but in maxim (that permits choice of action)

(C) Duty is necessity of an action done out of respect for law

“But what sort of law can that be the thought of which must determine the will without reference to any expected effect, so that the will can be called absolutely good without qualification?” (402):

3. III)First formulation of Categorical Imperative:
   

“… I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (402).

(1) Example: Lying promise—“The most direct and infallibale way, however, to answer the question as to whether a lying promise accords with duty is to ask myself whether I would really be content if my maxim (of extricating myself from difficulty by means of a false promise) were to hold as a universal law for myself as well as others, and could I really say to myself that everyone may promise falsely when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can find no other way to extricate himself” (403).  Kant’s answer: no, if I were to will all to lie, for if all lied, there would be no such thing as a promise, “Therefore, my maxim would necessarily destroy itself just as soon as it was made a universal law” (403).

(2) Linkage of Categorical Imperative formation to accordance with Duty (403)—pure respect for practical law is one’s duty; duty is the condition of a will good in itself.

Second Section: 

Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy

to a Metaphysics of Morals

I) Re-summation of Preface and 1st Section points:

(1) Experience cannot give us clear cases by which to duty done for duty’s sake, but this does not mean that duty is not the true moral determinant of actions (chosen by maxims out of respect for moral law); what matters is not actions, but principles (pp.406-7).

(2) Principles must be proved first in all empirical examples—such are great and necessary after, but only after, we clarify and prove the a priori (409-10).

(3) Popular conceptions of morality are so confused and they never study what they should, which is the purely rational as the ground for morality (410).

(4) Thus, it is clear that the true seat and origin of morality is a priori in reason (411).

(5) Methodology statement (412).

II) Picking up from the Categorical Imperative est. in 1st Section and Moving Forward:

(1) Everything in Nature works according to laws; humans have the capacity to choose; thus humans have reason and will; will is a faculty of practical reason.  Since the will does not completely accord to reason in humans, actions which are objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, thus determination of will by objective laws is necessary (412-3).

(2) Imperative (413-4): 

A command of reason: representation of an objective principle insofar as it necessitates the will.  The formula of the command is an imperative.  Expressed by an “ought.”  Presents a practical rule; they say something would be good to do or good to refrain from; the will does not have to obey.  Divine will has no imperatives it must obey; they are only human. 

(3) Categorical (versus hypothetical) (414-5):

Imperatives can be hypothetical or categorical for the will.  Hypothetical: practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want); action is good for something.  Hypothetical example: Happiness (good for some other end; skill to get it is Prudence).  Categorical: represent an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end; action is good in itself.  Not concerned with the matter of the action or its intended result; only concerned with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows.  This is the moral imperative.

(4) Categorical Imperative (416):

Categorical Imperative: represents an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end; action is good in itself.  Not concerned with the matter of the action or its intended result; only concerned with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows.  This is the moral imperative.

(5) Three Principles (imperatives) of Willing (416-7):

1) Rules of Skill—technical—belongs to art

2) Counsels of Prudence—pragmatic—belongs to welfare

3) Commands (laws) of Morals—moral—belongs to free conduct as such, i.e., to morals

To help understand his explanations of these imperatives, especially the most important one, the third:

Analytic = predicate part of definition, predicate contained in subject (a rose is a flower; a triangle has three sides; all bodies are extended).

Synthetic = predicate not part of definition (i.e. roses are red; a bachelor is an unmarried man; all bodies are heavy).  It extends our knowledge.  All judgments of experience are synthetic; judgments are like syntheses, tie knowledge together.

To ask how Analytic and Synthetic statements are known, we are asking about:

A priori = independent of experience (2+3=5; a bachelor is an unmarried man).  “Before experience.”  Pure knowledge—Reason is faculty that supplies these principles. 

A posteriori = dependent on experience (there are three apples; some bachelors are lonely).  “After experience.”  Empirical knowledge. 

Now, we can compound the analytic and synthetic with the a priori and a posteriori.  This results in the following:

There is no possible thing as an analytic a posteriori;

an analytic a priori is possible and common, warranted by law of non-contradiction;

a synthetic a posteriori is possible and common, warranted by experience (for example, Synthetic a posteriori = “The line is white.”  This judgment is made by empirical data);

a synthetical a priori is the general problem of Pure Reason and what he must establish as valid for his ethics to be valid; these are rational, yet not so rational so as to merely formal and thus disconnected from experience. 

An example of a synthetic a priori = “Everything that changes has a cause.”  These judgments must have their basis in us, in Pure Reason, but apply to objects outside of us, things of experience; they are truths that apply to outside objects without our having had experience of those objects.

Thus, in this section of the text, Kant finds that the first two types of imperatives are analytic, but have some connection to the synthetic when we consider the actions that one must do in the world as following from the imperatives decided by reason.  In the last imperative category, the commands of reason, Kant notes that these must be synthetic a priori. 

(6) How are these Three Principles possible?  i.e., When should they guide our actions? (417-20):

1) Rules of Skill—technical—belongs to art:  Requires no special discussion, according to Kant; “Whoever wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means that are indispensably necessary to his actions and that lie in his power” (417).  This proposition is analytic (Analytic = predicate part of definition, predicate contained in subject (a rose is a flower; a triangle has three sides; all bodies are extended))—so, “The imperative derives the concept of actions necessary to this end from the concept of willing this end” (417).  (Synthetic propositions are required fir determining the means to the end, but not concerned with the ground that is, the act of will; Synthetic = predicate not part of definition (i.e. roses are red; a bachelor is an unmarried man; all bodies are heavy); synthetics extend our knowledge; all judgments of experience are synthetic; judgments are like syntheses, tie knowledge together.)

2) Counsels of Prudence—pragmatic—belongs to welfare:  Harder to determine than Rules of Skill; concept of happiness is so indeterminate, cannot say what it is one really wishes for when one wishes for happiness; its elements are empirical, but the idea of it is rational (sort of, it is actually an idea of imagination, not reason per se); one cannot act according to determinate principles to get it, but only follow the empirical counsel of prudence.

3) Commands (laws) of Morals—moral—belongs to free conduct as such, i.e., to morals: not at all a hypothetical imperative, this one is purely a categorical imperative; not given in experience, thus we need to explore the possibility of a categorical imperative given entirely a priori; “… the categorical imperative alone purports to be a practical law, while all the others may be called principles of the will but not laws” (420); thus, we see the oddity: “The categorical imperative is an a priori synthetic practical proposition” (420) (Synthetic a priori = “Everything that changes has a cause.”  These judgments must have their basis in us, in Pure Reason, but apply to objects outside of us, things of experience; they are truths that apply to outside objects without our having had experience of those objects).

Thinking of a categorical imperative, we know immediately what it contains: besides the law, it contains only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law, nothing restricts this law, thus there remains only the universality of a law as such with which the maxim of the action should conform (420-1).  

III) Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative (421-33)

(1) “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (421)—this is conflated with “… Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature” (421).

(2) “… Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (429). 

(3) “… the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (431), this is “The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as legislating universal law by all his will’s maxims, so that he may judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to another very fruitful concept, which depends on the aforementioned one, viz., that of a kingdom of ends” (433). 

In Detail:

(1) “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (421)—this is conflated with “… Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature” (421).

This formulation is the categorical imperative (as opposed to practical imperative).

In relation to the four cases of duty.

(A) Suicide: 

1. A man living a miserable life asks himself if taking his own life would be against his duty to himself.  The reason is based on self-love; in the face of a miserable life, can he shorten its duration.  Thus, the question we must act is: can the “principle of self-love become a universal law of nature?”  Kant’s answer is no; nature uses love to stimulate the prolonging of life, so it would be contradictory to suppose that it could also use love as a justification of destroying life.
   

(B) Lying Promise:

1. A man needs to borrow money and knows he cannot repay it, but cannot get money without promising repayment.  The maxim would be: when I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, knowing that I cannot do so.  The reason here, too, is self-love or personal advantage.  Unlike the first case, it may ensure his prolonging of life into the future.  Kant says this cannot become a universal law of nature.  It destroys the whole idea of a promise.
   

(C) Cultivate talents / natural aptitude fulfilled or not:

1. A man has a talent that could be cultivated and prove useful in many ways, but he prefers his current pleasure than the work of this cultivation.  Universalizing this maxim can be done, making a world of laziness.  “But he cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such a law by natural instinct.  For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed …”
   

(D) Benefitting others or not:

1. A man has everything going well for him, but sees others struggling with hardships; he proposes that he will not harm them in anyway, but neither will he help them in any way.  Kant notes that the world could continue this way, but that it cannot be a law of nature; nature makes it so that we may all find ourselves possibly in need of love and sympathy, and the antipathy of this maxim prevents this need from ever being met.
   

A and B present cases whose maxims conflict with perfect duty.

C and D present cases whose maxims conflict with imperfect duty. 

(2) “… Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (429). 

This formulation is a practical imperative.

In relation to the four cases of duty.

(A) Suicide:

1. This case concerns necessary self duty.  Can suicide as an action be consistent with the idea of treating humanity as an end in itself?  Killing himself is using himself as a means to end a difficult situation, thus violating one’s own necessity of treatment as an end. 
   

(B) Lying Promise:

1. This case concerns necessary or strict duty to others.  Can lying be consistent with the idea of treating humanity as an end in itself?  No; it uses the other as a means.
   

(C) Cultivate talents / natural aptitude fulfilled or not:

1. This case concerns meritorious duty to others.  It is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our own person as an end; it must also harmonize with this end.  Not cultivating talents may make the self subsist, but it would not let the self advance.  Must consider both.
   

(D) Benefitting others or not:

1. This case concerns meritorious duty to others.  This would harmonize only negatively, not positively, with the idea of treating others only as ends.  Positive harmony would need all to also work to the ends of others as well as self. 
   

(3) “… the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (431), this is “The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as legislating universal law by all his will’s maxims, so that he may judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to another very fruitful concept, which depends on the aforementioned one, viz., that of a kingdom of ends” (433). 

This formulation (a practical principle of the will) is the supreme condition of the will’s conformity with universal practical reason. 

“Kingdom” (433): a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.

How this last formula is unique: 

“… indicate that in willing from duty the renunciation of all interest is the specific mark distinguishing a categorical imperative from a hypothetical one and that such renunciation was expressed in the imperative itself by means of some determination contained in it.  This is done in the present (third) formulation of the principle, namely in the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (431-2).

How it is inclusive of and follows from the former two:

Every rational being must universalize law, think of self and others as ends, not means, and will so that one could legislate universal law, which would be a systematic union of rational beings (used as ends) into a whole, that kingdom of ends.

Click ~~HERE~~ for case study examples involving the three formulations

of the categorical imperative.

IV) Freedom and its opposite in Heteronomy:

(1) Price and Dignity (434-5)

Price: something can be replaced by something else as its equivalent. 

Dignity: what is above all price and admits of no equivalent.

Human inclinations and needs have a price in the market place; matters of taste, the delight of mere unpurposive play of our mental powers has an affective price; what is an end in itself has an intrinsic worth, that is, a dignity (435).

(2) Autonomy (436)

“… autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (436).

All formulas of Categorical Imperative are one (the first, really), but different in subjective relation to individual so as to bring the idea of reason closer to intuition, thus closer to feeling.

All have:

1) Form: consists in universality (all maxims must be so chosen as if they were universal laws of nature).

2) Matter: end, end in oneself (which limits all conditional or arbitrary ends)

3) Complete determination of all maxims by the formula that all maxims proceeding from one’s own legislation ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.

Thus, the three represent:

Unity  Plurality  Totality

(3) Recap of whole ethical theory (437-40)

(4) Autonomy versus Heteronomy (440-45)

“Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself,” i.e., not a matter of volition.  The principle of autonomy: “Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law” (440).  This practical rule is an imperative.

Heteronomy: subject to a law or standard external to itself; acting in accord with desires instead of moral duty; the opposite of autonomy.

If the will seeks the law that is to determine it beyond the maxims of its own legislation of universal laws, thus goes outside of itself seeking these laws, seeking them in the objects, then heteronomy results.  In this case, the will does not give itself the law; the object does.  (I.e., the want controls you, you do not control your actions.)