Brief OUTLINE:

43b-44b: Intro

44b-46a: Crito’s arguments

46b-50a: Examination

....... 46b-48b: How decisions are made; mass opinion versus the expert

....... 48b-50a: What Socrates should do in the present case

50a-54d: Personification of the Laws

....... 50a-51c: First Speech (harm one law, harm all; city as parent or master)

....... 51c-52d: Second Speech (natural to be in political community)

....... 52d-54d: Third Speech (address of other arguments by Crito; what would happen)

Introduction and Crito’s Arguments:

43b:  Crito: I have often considered the way that you [Socrates] live to be happy.

43c-44b:  Boat will come soon; Socrates’ dream about ‘fertile Phthia’, unusual quote to use, for Achilles never leaves the war and goes home, so by parallel…

The dream is that a beautiful, well-formed woman in a white cloak approaches him and says, “Socrates, may you arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day”.  This is said by Achilles in Iliad ix 363 who refuses to reenter the fighting and threatens to go home and arrive there on the third day.  Achilles is inconsistent and never gets home, but Socrates does get to fertile Phthia.  Again the substitution of a new hero.  Achilles threatens to go but stays (and dies), while Socrates stays without threatening and so gets to go.  Intriguingly, too, Phthia is in Thessaly, where Socrates talks about going later.

What do we make of the opening?  Why does Crito question his peaceful sleep?  What does it mean to live happily?  How does this prove evidence of Socrates’ conviction, expressed in the Apology, that he has done right? 

What benefit comes from the introduction of a dream to start this dialogue? 

44b:  Crito moves to arguments for exile:

1—44b: deprived of a friend

2—44c: people will think I didn’t save you b/c of money

44c-d: Soc: don’t care about what people think

Crito: you must pay attention to majority opinion, this is precisely why you are to be executed!

Soc: No—if they did the greatest evil they would be capable of the greatest good, and they are capable of neither.

3—44e-45a: no trouble with informers, risk of punishment is worth it.

4—45c: You can go to Thessaly, will be safe there.

5—45c: What you are doing is not just.

6—45c: Betraying your sons by dying when you should live and educate them.

45e:  Repetition of shame/reputation argument, trial should not have happened, should not have had that verdict, you should not die.

46a:  Crito: Shameful for you, Socrates, and us (your friends).

What do you think of Crito’s arguments?  Are there others that you would have added?  Are there any here that you would have avoided?  Is it a successful case? 

Crito concludes:

Take counsel with yourself, or rather the time for counsel is past and the decision should have been taken, and there is no further opportunity, for this whole business must be ended tonight.  If we delay now, then it will no longer be possible, it will be too late.  Let me persuade you on every count, Socrates, and do not act otherwise (46a).

Crito seems to view the deliberative process as over and they should now be acting to save Socrates.  Though Crito has presented a series of arguments for Socrates to escape (albeit more concerned on surface with “what the many might say”), Crito is much less concerned about the arguments than about getting Socrates to prepare to escape.  It seems, then, that Crito is expressing some lack of concern for real argumentation.  Socrates addresses this before giving the case for why he should stay. 

Note the number of times and parties who say they will seek to persuade the others: Crito says this to Socrates, Socrates eventually tells Crito he will persuade him as to the rightness of his actions, and then the Laws say they will try to persuade Socrates to obey them, and finally, persuasion comes up in the Laws’ speech as the right action for a citizen if he will not obey the laws (i.e., that he should then seek to persuade them to be right).  What is the role of persuasion in philosophy?  Is this at odds with reason and rational argumentation to the truth?  Do they each mean persuasion in the same way?  How does persuasion tie in with Socrates’ divine mission?

When Socrates moves to address Crito’s arguments, his address divides into two parts:

1: about how decisions about action should be made.

2: about what Socrates should do in the present case.

46c:  Socrates moves to arguments addressing Crito’s arguments:

1st –On opinions of men—is it sound in every case to pay attention to some and not others?

One should value some, not all, opinions (46e) (See how this opposes the democratic view such as expressed by Meletus in the Apology.  The many as such is not thoughtful.  The many acts rather randomly (cf. 48c).)

One should value good, not bad, opinions (47a).

Good opinions from the wise, bad opinions from the foolish (47a).

Argument of Expertise (47a-d).

Life not worth living if body is ruined; and what justice pertains to [i.e., the soul] is even more estimable than the body (47e-48a).

Thus, we should not think so much of what the majority say, but only care for what the expert in truth and justice should say (48a-b).  “…the most important thing is not life, but the good life” (48b).

Note here, between the two addresses, that Socrates says that the other issues that Crito addresses are fit for those who accused him (Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon, plus the jury members who voted him guilty).  On the topic of his sons, see Apology 41d-42a for how he asks the jury to act rightly by him by doing to them what he has been convicted of doing to the Athenians. 

2nd –Just for Socrates to escape Athens when they have not acquitted him (48b-c)?

This is “…the only valid consideration…is whether we should be acting rightly in giving money and gratitude to those who will lead me out of here, and ourselves helping with the escape, or whether in truth we shall do wrong in doing all this” (48c-d).

We must never willingly do wrong in any way (49a).

Wrongdoing or injustice is harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer (49b).

If wronged, one must never inflict harm in return (49b).

Summary: “One should never do wrong in return, nor mistreat any man, no matter how one has been mistreated by him” (49c-d).

When one has come to an agreement with someone, one should fulfill it (49e).

“See what follows from this: if we leave here without the city’s permission, are we mistreating people whom we should least mistreat?  And are we sticking to a just agreement, or not?” (49e-50a).

Crito: “I cannot answer your question, Socrates.  I do not know” (50a).

What do you think of this argument?  Is Socrates too leading in his questions?  The way he poses each point may leave little room for Crito to answer otherwise, but is Socrates doing each point justice?  Why or why not?  Is there a reason for his handling of these points in this way? 

What do you think of Crito’s last response?  Does he not know, or is he just not willing to accede?  Is there another reason (or reasons) why Crito should say no, that it is not just?  If you were Crito, would you add any other arguments to this? 

50a+ Personification of the LAWS:

Where there is an expert, we should listen.  The Laws might stand in for the one expert.

Laws do most of the talking—Socrates subjected to questioning (and since Socrates is the one subjected to elenchus (his method of argumentation, the flow of the dialogue back and forth), the arguments should be reasonably good).

1st Speech by LAWS (50a-51c):

Laws would say to us: Escaping and evading the sanction of law threatens the whole system of law (the state) not just one law. 

Would we respond: “The city wronged me, and its decision was not right” (50c)?

Laws would respond with analogy of: City as parent or master: the point is that humans naturally belong in political communities, that the political community surpasses the individual in importance (notice: Athens not mentioned specifically here).  The point is that the human as such is developed by living in a community under law.  One should not undermine political life as Socrates would be (as indicated) if he sought exile.  Thus he has justly agreed to accept political community and law and legal sanction. 

What do you think: Is this a conventional agreement to Athens or a natural agreement to community as such?  What does the text say versus what would you say?  For the text, there seems to be the accord that the agreement to the city is NATURAL.

Look closely at the passage about ‘persuade or obey’ –what do you think of this either/or?  Do you think it is an universal argument for law, or is Socrates specifically alluding to the idea that he should have persuaded the courts (i.e., done everything he could to win the case) or simply accept and obey the punishment?

Consider the passage:

That if we undertake to destroy you and think it right to do so, you can undertake to destroy us, as far as you can, in return?  And will you say that you are right to do so, you who really care for virtue?  Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father and all your ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the gods and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it and placate its anger more than your father’s?  You must either persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey.  To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one’s post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey [poien] the commands of one’s city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice.  It is impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father, it is much more so to use it against your country (51a-c).

What is the conflict potentially here if we consider community or coming together in political organization natural or conventional?  Are we naturally inclined to organize?  (Like Aristotle’s pronouncement, we are, by nature, political animals?)  Or, are we naturally wild and free, and only come together if we suppress our natural instincts of violence and power in order to live together?  If the impulse if natural, it may provide the needed support for the necessity to obey the law—because then, obedience would be us acting fully naturally.  If not, however, and society is mere convention—we come together by willing ourselves to give up some natural, evil impulses in order to reap the benefits of communal life—then what is the power by which we must obey? 

Also, notice here that he first says “persuade or obey” (actually persuade or do what is commanded), but then reverses this to “obey or persuade”, i.e., do the commands or persuade, perhaps in court when one is indicted.  In the next speech [52a] it is again reversed; but this speech is in the context of Athens.  Does the order of these options matter? 

Finally, consider the idea of how it is impious to do violence to one’s country.  What does this mean?  Is this always the case?  By killing the tyrant do we do violence to the homeland?  Did Socrates do violence to Athens by not obeying the order of the Thirty to go get Leon, the man he was ordered to bring before them?  Or, did he do violence against Athens simply by breaking convention and annoying people or acting outside of standard decorum in the courts?  Would standing up to Hitler be impious?  Would Gandhi’s nonviolent action against British colonial rule be impious?  Would King’s nonviolent direct action campaigns for civil rights be impious?  Or, would these be acts of persuasion?  What if persuasion is violent?  How do we know when one should obey or persuade?  How would we want to qualify this statement? 

2nd Speech by LAWS (51c-52d): 

In the second speech the Laws soon mention Athens. 

While it is natural for us to be in political communities, it is somewhat conventional to be in this particular community.  So the Laws stress that Socrates could have left when he became an adult.  Staying in Athens, one has agreed to its system of laws and sanctions.  Socrates has especially agreed since he hardly ever went out of the city, he has had kids in Athens, and Socrates could have proposed exile in the court but did not.  So he must now accept the sentence. 

Has Socrates agreed to its laws and sanctions when he was there?  Was not his being a gadfly a bit of an act of challenge?  If one wants to persuade, instead of obeying, doesn’t one have to stay? 

3rd Speech by LAWS (52d-54d):

The third speech restates that he has been more devoted to Athens than others, going out less than the lame and blind.  Curious that they mention Sparta (and Crete) as two cities where Socrates could have gone to, since he had said that they were well governed … Sparta?  Funny to mention the place that had installed the Thirty, the oligarchic regime before democracy’s restoration.

The Laws go on to answer the other arguments from Crito.  Were Socrates to go to other well-governed cities (for instance, Thebes or Megara), he would go as an enemy since he shows himself a corrupter of laws and worthy of being convicted.  Would he choose to go to less well-governed cities and inferior men, either wholly uncivilized cities or at least those that are civilized but less rigorously so (for instance Thessaly)?  What would Socrates talk about?  Not virtue and justice?  Maybe how he sneaked away?  This is unworthy of Socrates.  As soon as he started to be how he has been, he would annoy the people and be brought up on charges again.  He has claimed he cannot simply be quiet and not do philosophy.  So, does he so eagerly seek to live?

And the children if he takes them with him will be outsiders and in a less well-ordered place.  Their education will be unfulfilled.  And if he leaves them in Athens to be cared for by his friends, is this not what he would do if he accepts the penalty and commits suicide?

It will be better for Socrates and those around him either on earth or in Hades if he escapes unjustly.  The Laws will be against him if he lives and the brother laws in Hades will be against him there (54c).  This suggests that human laws (convention) have some natural foundation.

Laws: “As it is, you depart, if you depart, after being wronged not by us, the laws, but by men…” (54b-c).

Socrates hears this like the Corybantes’ flutes (the Corybantes are represented as a kind of inspired people, subject to Bacchic frenzy, and inspiring terror at the celebration of the sacred rites by means of war-dances, noise, cymbals, drums, and arms. Also said to have been the guardian divinities of baby Zeus who sang or banged on shields to cover up the crying of baby Zeus so Cronus, his father, would not hear and then devour him).  This drowns out other arguments.  They cannot be heard.  Socrates is willing to discuss other arguments if Crito has them, but he supposes that these will hold.